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Abstract
We analyze the welfare cost of inflation in a model with cash-in-advance con-
straints and an endogenous distribution of establishments’ productivities. Inflation
distorts aggregate productivity through firm entry dynamics. The model is calibrated
to the United States economy and the long-run equilibrium properties are compared
at low and high inflation. We find that increasing the annual inflation rate by 10
percentage points above the average rate in the U.S. would result in a fall in average
productivity of roughly 1.3 percent. This decrease in productivity is not innocuous:
it is responsible for about one half of the welfare cost of inflation.
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1 Introduction
Whether the adoption of monetary policy rules that reduce inflation and interest rates leads
to important welfare gains is a central question in monetary economics1. Calculations often
suggest that the effects of changes in the inflation rate on capital accumulation are modest.
However, if international differences in income per capita are explained by differences in the
accumulation of productive factors and by differences in the efficiency in the employment of
these factors, then the welfare cost of inflation will be high if it discourages the accumulation
of factors of production or if it leads to less efficiency in their use. The first possibility has
been extensively examined in the literature however the latter has been neglected. In this
paper we begin the exploration of this second possibility.
Measures of the welfare cost of inflation are usually derived by comparing steady states
levels of aggregate consumption at different rates of money growth within the framework
of monetary equilibrium growth models. Money is often introduced by means of cash-in-
advance constraints which require agents to hold money balances to facilitate transactions.
Cooley and Hansen (1989) show that when the neoclassical growth model is augmented
with this structure, the relative price of consumption with respect to leisure increases as
the long-run rate of monetary growth increases. Consequently agents substitute away from
labor, which induces employment and output to drop. Stockman (1981) shows that, when
the cash-in-advance constraint also applies to investment goods, a similar effect operates
through lower capital accumulation. At moderate inflation rates, these models produce
welfare costs equivalent to slightly less than one percent of real income; for example, Cooley
and Hansen (1989) report that, in steady state, a 10 percent inflation rate results in a welfare
cost of about 0.4 percent of income relative to an optimal monetary policy.
However, in these earlier models average productivity is exogenous and only the ac-
cumulation of factors of production matters to determine income. Gomme (1993), De
Gregorio (1993) and Jones and Manuelli (1995) extend the work on the effects of monetary
policy to models of endogenous growth and find the welfare cost of inflation to be either
of the same magnitude or an order of magnitude smaller. But their work assumes a single
representative firm and abstract from heterogeneity in production units. If, however, the
allocation of aggregate resources across uses is important in understanding cross-country
1See Lucas (2000).
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differences in per capita incomes, then it is not only the level of factor accumulation that
matters, but also how these factors are allocated across heterogeneous production units2.
Since large differences in income per capita cannot be accounted for simply by differences in
the accumulation of production factors, to answer the question of whether the welfare cost
of inflation is important we should consider a framework where the allocation of factors
across establishments with different productivity levels is potentially affected by money3. In
the context of a general equilibrium monetary economy model, Dotsey and Ireland (1996),
persuasively argue that the inflation tax may distort a variety of marginal decisions and
that various small distortions may combine to yield substantial estimates of the welfare cost
of inflation. Thus, to confidently examine whether an economy is better off at low levels
of inflation in the framework of monetary equilibrium growth models, average productivity
should be endogenous and potentially affected by the monetary growth rate.
In this paper, we investigate what is the impact of higher rates of monetary growth
on the real economy including output, consumption, investment, hours worked and pro-
ductivity in a model where the productivity distribution of incumbent establishments is
endogenous. For this purpose, we build a model characterized with cash-in-advance con-
straints on consumption and investment goods, and in addition we assume that liquidity
constraints also apply to the creation of new establishments. Because efficiency in the use
of the factors of production is an important channel influencing output, the model con-
siders establishment heterogeneity along the lines of Hopenhayn (1992), Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993) and Melitz (2003). In this framework, we are able to analyze the effect
of long-run monetary growth on output per worker and we confirm the finding of previ-
ous literature that monetary growth has a negative impact on output in a cash-in-advance
economy. In addition to discouraging investment and labor supply, we find that an increase
in the long-run rate of money growth increases the cost of creating new establishments.
2There is substantial evidence of the importance of capital and labor allocation across establishments as
a determinant of aggregate productivity. Studies document that about half of overall productivity growth
in U.S. manufacturing can be attributed to factor reallocation from low productivity to high productivity
establishments for different time periods. See for instance Baily et al. (1992), Bartelsman and Doms (2000)
and Foster et al. (2008), among others.
3Indeed, the prevailing view in development accounting is that cross-country differences in income per
capita are mostly explained by differences in Total Factor Productivity. See King and Levine (1994),
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005).
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As a result, incumbent establishments’ profits must increase so as to encourage industry
entry. This occurs through a fall in the equilibrium wage rate. The fall in wages allows
new establishments with low productivity to stay in the industry leading to a reallocation
of the factors of production toward less efficient establishments. This adjustment in the
size distribution of production plants lowers average productivity in the economy.
We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and find that increasing the annual inflation
rate by 10 percentage points above the average rate in the U.S. would result in a fall in
average productivity of about 1.3 percent. Quantitatively, it may be responsible for almost
1/2 of the effect of inflation on welfare. We consider several alternative calibrations to
the benchmark economy, revealing the importance of the assumptions made regarding the
returns to scale and the dispersion of productivities across establishments. We show that,
when money distorts establishments’ entry dynamics, the welfare cost from a monetary
policy that increases inflation rates from 2 percent to 12 percent may represent roughly
5 percent of aggregate consumption, confirming results by Atkeson et al. (1996) on the
importance of heterogeneity and decreasing returns to scale for interpreting cross-country
differences in macroeconomic outcomes.
In work which is also related to this paper, Wu and Zhang (2001) examine the effects
of anticipated inflation in a framework characterized by monopolistic competition and a
well defined industry structure. In their paper, firms’ mark-ups are affected by the rate
of inflation. They find that at higher rates of inflation the number of firms is less and
their size is smaller. The resulting welfare cost of inflation is larger than the conventional
estimates. In our paper, the welfare cost of inflation is also higher than those obtained
in conventional models. However, in our paper markets are competitive and the higher
welfare cost is associated with the change in the productivity distribution of incumbent
establishments. Thus, firm entry is affected by anticipated inflation and the model also
predicts that the number of productive establishments as well as their average size is lower
at high rates of inflation.
Given the abundance of empirical evidence indicating the importance of producers’
heterogeneity and selection-based productivity growth, it is hardly surprising that an influ-
ential literature has developed, which examines the reallocation effects of policy distortions.
In an article mentioned earlier, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) consider the effect on av-
erage productivity and welfare of employment protection in a setting characterized with
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firm entry and exit dynamics. They find that a tax on job destruction results in a decrease
in average productivity of over 2 percent. In a related paper Veracierto (2001) extends
Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s analysis of firing taxes by introducing a flexible form of capital
and considering transition dynamics. Veracierto finds that firing taxes equal to one year
of wages have large long-run effects: they decrease steady state output, capital, consump-
tion, and wages by 7.84 percent and steady state employment by 6.62 percent. With the
purpose of studying the role of international trade, Melitz (2003) shows how aggregate
industry productivity growth caused by reallocations across heterogeneous establishments
contribute to additional welfare gains from trade liberalization.
The role of policy distortions in environments with industry dynamics has also influ-
enced the literature on development. For instance, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) consider
policy distortions that lead to reallocation of resources across heterogeneous firms. Their
aim is to examine whether policies that leave aggregate relative prices unchanged but distort
the prices faced by different producers can explain cross-country differences in per capita
incomes. In their benchmark model they find that the reallocation of resources implied
by such policies can lead to decreases in output and productivity in the range of 30 to 50
percent, even though the underlying range of available technologies across establishments
is the same in all policy configurations. Samaniego (2006) proposes a model of plant dy-
namics to analyze the effects of policies that affect establishments differently depending on
the stage of their life-cycle, notably subsidies to failing plants. He finds that these subsidies
may increase aggregate productivity. Guner et al. (2008) find that policies that distort
the size-distribution of incumbent establishments may lead to substantial output and pro-
ductivity falls. Finally, Alfaro et al. (2008) investigate, using plant-level data for several
countries, whether differences in the allocation of resources across heterogeneous plants are
a significant determinant of cross-country differences in income per worker. They find that
allowing for firm heterogeneity improves the model ability to explain differences in produc-
tivity across countries. Our paper introduces firm heterogeneity and industry dynamics
into a monetary growth model and considers the distortions introduced by the inflation
tax, when money holdings are required to create new establishments.
Another important literature examines the welfare cost of inflation in the context of
monetary search models. Influential papers include Rocheteau and Wright (2005), and La-
gos and Rocheteau (2005). The debate over the welfare costs of inflation in this framework
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is still very much ongoing. Under the canonical search model of money with ex-post bilat-
eral Nash bargaining between a buyer and a seller, higher anticipated inflation decreases
search effort, the frequency of trades, and aggregate output leading to welfare losses. How-
ever, the welfare losses are small under competitive search and may be negative under
price-taking behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay out the details
of our model and describe the stationary competitive equilibrium. In Section 3 we investi-
gate the qualitative effect of changes in the monetary growth rate on the endogenous real
aggregates and the size distribution of productive establishments. Section 4 discusses the
procedure for calibrating our model and section 5 presents our model-based quantitative
findings. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a cash-in-advance production economy, which exhibits establishment level
heterogeneity as studied by Hopenhayn (1992) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). Es-
tablishments have access to a decreasing returns to scale technology, pay a fixed cost to
remain in operation each period and are subject to entry and exit. In what follows we
first describe the problem of the household confronted with a cash-in-advance constraint,
next we describe the production side in more detail and finally characterize the stationary
competitive equilibrium.
2.1 The household
There is an infinitely-lived representative household with preferences over streams of con-
sumption and leisure at each date described by the utility function
U =
∞∑
t=0
βt (lnCt + A lnLt) ,
where Ct is consumption at date t, Lt is leisure and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
The representative agent is endowed with one unit of productive time each period and
has K0 > 0 units of capital at date 0. She owns three types of assets: capital, cash, and
production establishments. The mass of (incumbent) establishments at time t is denoted
by Ht.
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The timing of the household decision problem resembles the one in Stockman (1981).
The household enters period t with nominal money balances equal to mt−1 that are carried
over from the previous period and in addition receives a lump-sum transfer equal to gMt−1
(in nominal terms), where Mt is the per capita money supply in period t. Thus, the money
stock follows the law of motion
Mt = (1 + g)Mt−1.
Output has three purposes: (i) it can serve as a consumption good ; (ii) as an investment
good which increases the stock of capital owned by the household; (iii) as a marketing good
which has to be purchased in order to create new establishments. Households are required
to use their previously acquired money balances to purchase goods. Because we want to
compare situations when the constraint applies to some types of good but not to others,
we introduce three parameters that we denote by θi with i = c, k, h. When θc = 1 the
cash-in-advance constraint applies to the consumption good, when θk = 1 purchases of the
investment good are constrained and when θh = 1 the constraint applies to the marketing
good needed to create a new establishment. When θi = 0 (i = c, k, h) the constraint does
not apply to the specific good and this good is said to be a credit good in the Lucas and
Stokey (1987) sense. Hence, the constraint reads as
θcCt + θkXt + θhκEt ≤ mt−1 + gMt−1
pt
, (1)
where pt is the price level at time t, Xt is investment, given by
Xt = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt (2)
and κ is the quantity of marketing good that has to be purchased to create each new
establishment and constitutes a sunk cost. Et is the mass of new establishments created.
The representative household must choose consumption, investment, leisure, nominal
money holdings and the mass of new establishments subject to the cash-in-advance con-
straint (1) and the budget constraint
Ct +Xt + κEt +
mt
pt
≤ wt (1− Lt) + rtKt + z¯tHt + (mt−1 + gMt−1) /pt, (3)
where wt is the wage rate, rt the interest rate and z¯t are average dividends across incumbent
establishments.
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We assume that the gross growth rate of money, 1 + g, always exceeds the discount
factor, β, which is a sufficient condition for (1) to always bind in equilibrium and existence
of a stationary equilibrium4. We sometimes denote real money balances by µt =
mt
pt
.
2.2 Production establishments
Once a new establishment is created at t, its idiosyncratic productivity s ∈ S is revealed
as drawn from a distribution F (s) and remains constant over time until the establishment
exits the industry. At t+1 the establishment starts production. Incumbent establishments
produce output by renting labor and capital. The production function of an establishment
with idiosyncratic productivity s at time t is
ys,t = sn
α
s,tk
ν
s,t − η, (4)
where ns,t and ks,t are labor and capital employed, η is a fixed operating cost, α ∈ (0, 1),
ν ∈ (0, 1) and ν + α < 1. The flow profits of an incumbent establishment are given by
zs,t = max
ns,t,ks,t
{
snαs,tk
ν
s,t − wtns,t − rtks,t − η
}
, (5)
where wt is the wage rate and rt is the interest rate.
Establishments exit both because of exogenous exit shocks and endogenous decisions.
In particular, in any given period after production takes place, each establishment faces a
constant probability of death equal to λ. Moreover, an establishment decides to leave the
industry if its discounted profits are negative. Given that we only analyze the stationary
equilibrium of the economy and idiosyncratic productivities are constant over time, it turns
out that the only moment when an establishment decides to leave the industry is upon entry.
This is because profits are constant over time in the stationary equilibrium. Consequently,
establishments choose to exit when
zs < 0.
We denote by s∗ the idiosyncratic productivity threshold below which establishments choose
to exit. Specifically, s∗ is such that zs∗ = 0.
4It can be shown that the existence of a steady state requires 1 + g ≥ β. See Abel (1985).
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Given the first order conditions which solve the problem of incumbent firms (5) the
labor demand by an establishment with productivity s is
ns,t = s
σ
(
α
wt
)(1−ν)σ (
ν
rt
)νσ
(6)
and the demand for capital reads
ks,t = s
σ
(
α
wt
)ασ (
ν
rt
)(1−α)σ
, (7)
where σ = (1− α− ν)−1. Replacing the factor demands into the profit function yields
zs,t = Ω
sσ
wασt r
νσ
t
− η, (8)
where Ω = αασννσ − α(1−ν)σννσ − αασν(1−α)σ.
Let h(s; t) denote the mass of incumbent establishments with productivity level s at
time t. The motion equation for h(s; t) is given by
h(s; t+ 1) = (1− λ)h(s; t) + EtdF (s)I[s ≥ s∗], (9)
where I is an indicator function that takes value one if the expression in brackets is true and
zero otherwise. With Ht =
∫
s∈S h(s; t)ds denoting the mass of incumbent establishments.
Consequently, the mass of entrants reads
Et =
Ht+1 − (1− λ)Ht
1− F (s∗) . (10)
Finally, following Melitz (2003), it is useful to define average productivity as
s¯t =
{∫
s≥s∗
sσ
dF (s)
1− F (s∗)
} 1
σ
. (11)
Hence, with knowledge of s∗ one can identify s¯t. From equation (8), this implies that
average dividends read as
z¯t =
∫
s≥s∗
zs,t
dF (s)
1− F (s∗)ds = Ω
s¯σt
wασt r
νσ
t
− η. (12)
2.3 Household optimal behavior
The Bellman equation characterizing household’s optimal behavior reads as
V (mt−1, Kt, Ht) = max
Ct,Lt,mt,Kt+1,Ht+1
{lnCt + A lnLt + βV (mt, Kt+1, Ht+1)} , (13)
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and is subject to the cash-in-advance constraint (1) and the budget constraint (3).
Let φt and γt be the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for the constraints (1) and (3), respectively.
The first-order conditions which characterize the solution to the problem of the household
are
1
Ct
− θcφt − γt = 0, (14)
A
Lt
− γtwt = 0 (15)
βV1 (mt, Kt+1, Ht+1)− γt
pt
= 0, (16)
βV2 (mt, Kt+1, Ht+1)− θkφt − γt = 0, (17)
βV3 (mt, Kt+1, Ht+1)− κ
1− F (s∗t )
(θhφt + γt) = 0, (18)
plus the budget constraint and the complementary slackness condition associated with the
budget constraint. Moreover, by the envelope theorem, the shadow values of money, capital
and the mass of establishments are respectively
V1 (mt−1, Kt, Ht) =
φt + γt
pt
, (19)
V2 (mt−1, Kt, Ht) = (1− δ) (θkφt + γt) + γtrt. (20)
and
V3 (mt−1, Kt, Ht) =
1− λ
1− F (s∗t )
κ (θhφt + γt) + γtz¯t. (21)
Combining (19), (20) and (21) and the first-order conditions (16), (17) and (18) yields the
three Euler equations
β
φt+1 + γt+1
pt+1
− γt
pt
= 0, (22)
β (1− δ) (θkφt+1 + γt+1) + βγt+1rt+1 − θkφt − γt = 0 (23)
and
β
1− λ
1− F (s∗t+1)
κ (θhφt+1 + γt+1) + βγt+1z¯t+1 − κ θkφt + γt
1− F (s∗t )
= 0. (24)
Equations (14) and (22)-(24), combined with the intra-temporal first-order condition
(15) and the budget constraint (3) characterize the solution to the household problem.
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2.4 Market clearing
Market clearing conditions for labor and capital are given, respectively, by
Nt =
∫
s∈S
ns,th(s; t)ds (25)
and
Kt =
∫
s∈S
ks,th(s; t)ds. (26)
Market clearing in the money market requires
mt = Mt. (27)
Finally, the economy’s feasibility constraint reads
Ct +Xt + κEt = Yt, (28)
where Yt ≡
∫
s∈S ys,th(s; t)ds.
2.5 Stationary equilibrium
We consider the steady-state competitive equilibrium of the model. In a steady-state
equilibrium, all rental rates and real aggregates are constant over time. Moreover, the
gross rate of inflation Π ≡ Pt+1
Pt
is also constant, equal to the gross rate of monetary growth
1 + g. Thus, we henceforth ignore all time subscripts to simplify the notation.
We now illustrate three effects of inflation related to the three cash-in-advance con-
straints of the economy.
Since the shadow values φ and γ are each positive and constant in the steady-state5,
from equations (14), (15) and (22), consumption and leisure in the steady-state equilibrium
satisfy the condition
L
C
=
A
w
[
1 + θc
(
1 + g
β
− 1
)]
. (29)
Equation (29) suggests that, when the cash-in-advance constraint applies to consumption,
an increase in inflation raises the cost of consumption relative to leisure. This result corre-
sponds to the effect examined in Cooley and Hansen (1989).
5See Stockman (1981).
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Given equations (22) and (23), the representative household problem yields the station-
ary equilibrium rental rate of capital, given by
r =
(
1
β
− 1 + δ
)[
1 + θk
(
1 + g
β
− 1
)]
(30)
Equation (30) shows that the rental cost of capital is increasing in the rate of anticipated
inflation when the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the investment good. It also sug-
gests the following mechanism. When the cash-in-advance constraint applies to investment,
inflation increases the cost of holding money balances, which reduces capital accumulation.
As a result, at higher inflation, the rental cost of capital is higher. This result is due to
Stockman (1981).
Finally, from equations (22) and (24) a free-entry condition reads
κ
[
1 + θh
(
1 + g
β
− 1
)]
= [1− F (s∗)] βz¯
1− β(1− λ) . (31)
Equation (31) states that in equilibrium the sunk cost that has to be paid to create a
new establishment (the left-hand side of (31)) has to be equal to the expected discounted
profits from creating this establishment (the right-hand side of (31)). The rate of discount
of profits depends on the household discount factor β and the probability λ that the new
establishment dies in future periods. The probability [1− F (s∗)] also appears on the right-
hand side of (31) because one has to account for the probability of successful entry when
evaluating discounted profits.
Equation (31) characterizes the mechanism by which money growth affects the estab-
lishments entry decision. When the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the marketing
good, an increase in inflation makes entry more costly. The next Section shows that this
has an effect on average productivity too.
Hence, inflation may have three effects, depending on the structure of the cash-in-
advance constraint. It may affect labor supply, capital accumulation and the productivity
distribution of incumbent establishments. Each effect contributes to lowering the level
of output. This allows us in the next Section to state a Proposition on the real effects
of inflation. Before doing this, we go through the remaining relations characterizing the
equilibrium.
In the stationary competitive equilibrium the optimal exit rule by incumbent estab-
lishments requires zs∗ = 0. This yields a solution for the productivity threshold, given
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Figure 1: Determination of s∗ and w in the stationary economy
WW
s*
SS
w
by
s∗ = wαrν
( η
Ω
)1−α−ν
. (32)
Since the equilibrium interest rate is determined by (30), the exit condition characterizes a
relation between the wage rate and the productivity threshold which is represented by the
SS locus in Figure 1.
In turn, the expected value of entry, i.e. the right-hand side of the free-entry condi-
tion (31) is locally independent of s∗ by the envelope theorem (see Appendix A for proof).
Consequently, the equilibrium wage rate is independent of s∗, as illustrated by the WW
locus in Figure 1. Hence, in an equilibrium with production the free-entry condition deter-
mines the wage rate.
Finally, solving for the fixed point of (9) and integrating over productivity levels yields
H = E
∫
s∈S
I[s ≥ s∗]
λ
dF (s), (33)
which, combined with the resource constraint (28), gives a solution for the mass of incum-
bent establishments, completing the characterization of the stationary competitive equilib-
rium. Specifically, the stationary competitive equilibrium is defined as follows6:
6It is shown in the appendix B that the equilibrium exists and is unique.
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Definition 1. A stationary competitive equilibrium is a wage rate w, a rental rate of capital
r, an aggregate distribution of establishments h(s), a mass of entry E, a household value
function V (m,K,H), an establishment profit function zs, a productivity threshold s
∗, policy
functions for incumbent establishments ns and ks and aggregate levels of consumption C,
employment N , capital K and real money balances µ, such that:
i. The household optimizes: equations (29), (30) and (31);
ii. Establishments optimize: equations (6), (7) and (32);
iii. Markets clear: equations (25), (26), (27) and (28);
iv. h(s) is an invariant distribution, i.e. a fixed point of (9).
To summarize, the model is solved as follows. First, the rental cost of capital is pinned
down by equation (30). Then, given the value of r, one can solve for the values of the
wage rate w and the productivity threshold s∗ from (31) and (32). One can consequently
characterize fully the stationary distribution of capital, employment, profits and output
with equations (4), (6), (7) and (8) across incumbent firms. Finally, the feasibility con-
straint (28), together with the other market-clearing conditions and the first-order condition
for leisure (29), allow to determine the mass of incumbents H and all the aggregates of the
economy such as investment, consumption, output, the stock of capital and employment7.
3 The real effects of inflation
We now investigate the relation between inflation, the equilibrium aggregates K and N ,
and the size distribution of productive establishments, characterized by s∗. Proposition 1
summarizes our main result
PROPOSITION 1. Consider the stationary competitive equilibrium as defined earlier.
i. If θc = θk = θh = 0, an increase in the inflation rate Π has no effect on the economy.
7In the Appendix E, we present all the equations that characterize the stationary equilibrium for the
particular restriction that we impose on the distribution F . See also Section 4, where we describe the
calibration procedure.
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Figure 2: Effect of an increase in the monetary growth rate g on s∗ and w when θk = 1
and θh = 0
WW0
SS
WW1
s*
SS0
1
w
ii. If θc = 1 and θk = θh = 0, an increase in the inflation rate Π is associated with a fall
in the equilibrium capital stock K and a fall in the employment rate N . However, the
productivity threshold, s∗, does not change.
iii. If θk = 1 and θc = θh = 0, an increase in the inflation rate Π is associated with a fall
in the equilibrium capital stock K and a fall in the employment rate N . However, the
productivity threshold, s∗, does not change.
iv. If θh = 1 and θc = θk = 0, an increase in the inflation rate Π is associated with a fall
in the equilibrium capital stock K, a fall in the employment rate N and a fall in the
productivity threshold, s∗.
In what follows we discuss some aspect related to Proposition 1, however, the detailed
proof is developed in the Appendix D. When θi = 0 for all i, all goods are credit goods and
therefore money growth has no real effects. When consumption is a cash good condition (29)
is affected by money growth. At high rates of inflation, the marginal utility of leisure must
fall with respect to the product of the wage rate and the marginal utility of consumption,
leading the household to supply less labor. Lower hours worked leads to lower output
and therefore lower consumption and capital stock. The rental cost of capital, determined
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Figure 3: Effect of an increase in the monetary growth rate g on s∗ and w when θh = 1
and θk = 0
s*
WW0
SS
WW1
w
by (30), remains the same and, therefore both the SS relation and the WW relation, in
Figure 1, are unaffected. Thus the wage rate and average productivity are unaffected.
When θk = 1, i.e. investment is a cash good, condition (30) is affected. At high
rates of inflation the return on capital must increase as individuals are less willing to
invest. The increase in the rental cost of capital lowers profits for the same wage rate
and therefore the probability of a successful entry decreases at each wage rate (i.e. the
SS locus in Figure 2 shifts upward). However the probability of successful entry must
remain unchanged in equilibrium since the cost of creating a new establishment (the left-
hand side of equation (31)) has not changed. Thus, for there to be an equilibrium with
entry, the wage rate must fall sufficiently for the free entry condition to be satisfied. The
WW locus in Figure 1 shifts left. At high rates of inflation the wage rate is lower and the
average productivity and the probability of successful entry are unaffected, as illustrated
by Figure 2.
When the marketing good is a cash good, θh = 1, the cash-in-advance constraint in-
creases the cost of creating new establishments and the comparative static is the same as
the one corresponding to an increase in the sunk cost, illustrated in Figure 3. In particular,
consider the comparative statics of moving from a stationary equilibrium with a low rate
16
of monetary growth to an equilibrium with a high rate of monetary growth. For there to
be an equilibrium with entry, firms’ expected value of entry must increase. Since the rental
cost of capital remains unchanged, firms are not willing to enter the industry unless the
wage rate falls. Accordingly the WW locus has to shift to the left which translates into a
movement along the SS curve. This in turn leads to a lower productivity threshold.
4 Calibration
In this section we describe the model calibration procedure. Since we consider different
model specifications – corresponding to different values for θi, i = c, k, h – the calibration
of some parameters changes across specification. When this happens, we report the interval
range of values taken by the parameter (see Table 1).
In order to solve our model we need to specify a distribution for the establishments’
productivity draws F (s). Following Helpman et al. (2004), we assume a Pareto distribution
for F with lower bound s0 and shape parameter ε > σ, i.e. F (s) = 1 −
(
s0
s
)ε
. The shape
parameter is an index of the dispersion of productivity draws: dispersion decreases as ε
increases, and the productivity draws are increasingly concentrated toward the lower bound
s0. This assumption has two advantages: it generates a distribution of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivities among incumbent establishments that fits microeconomic data quite well8 and
delivers close-form solutions for the endogenous aggregates9. Specifically, the distribution
of productivities among incumbent establishments, which is the distribution F truncated
at s = s∗, is also Pareto with lower bound s∗ and shape parameter ε.
We calibrate the model to data for the United States. The length of each period is one
year. The growth rate of the money supply g is chosen to be 2.43 percent which matches the
average annual rate of inflation in the U.S. between 1988 and 2007, reported in the World
Economic Indicators database. For labor and capital income shares, α and ν respectively,
empirical evidence concerning establishment level returns to scale, reported by Atkeson
and Kehoe (2005) suggests the relation α+ ν = 0.85. In particular, these authors consider
this choice to be consistent with the evidence in Atkenson et al. (1996). The separate
identification of α and ν is done according to the income shares of labor and capital. Based
8See Axtell (2001) and Cabral and Mata (2003).
9See the Appendix E for the complete description of the model solution.
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Table 1: Parameters: summary
Notation Value Parameter
g 0.0243 Monetary growth rate
α 0.6095 Labor income share
ν 0.2405 Capital income share
δ 0.0956 Depreciation rate of capital
β [0.9722 , 0.9775] Household’s discount factor
ε 7.2655 Pareto distribution shape parameter
λ 0.0696 Failure rate of incumbent establishments
s0 1 Pareto distribution lower bound
κ 1 Sunk entry cost
η [0.0103 , 0.0116] Fixed operating cost
A [2.3803 , 2.5472] Disutility of labor
Note: The calibration of β, η and A varies according to the model specification and, in particular, according to the value taken by θc, θk and
θc. Thus, we report the range of values taken by β, η and A.
on Gomme and Rupert (2007) we assign 28.3 percent to capital and the remainder to labor,
yielding α = 0.6095 and ν = 0.2405.
The annual depreciation rate δ is chosen to be 9.56 percent based on evidence from the
BEA as reported in Gomme and Rupert (2007). In particular, Gomme and Rupert (2007)
distinguish between capital depreciation of market structures and capital depreciation of
equipment and software. The 9.56 percent correspond to the weighted average of the de-
preciation rate of each component according to their share in GDP. Given the depreciation
rate, the rental cost of capital r is chosen to match the investment-output ratio, given by
X
Y
= δ
ν
r. Notice that the investment-output ratio is calculated with output net of govern-
ment expenditure. The implied rental cost of capital is 12.42 percent. In turn, this implies
β = 0.9775 when θk = 1 and β = 0.9722 when θk = 0.
Following Ghironi and Melitz (2005), we choose the shape parameter of the F distribu-
tion in order to match the standard deviation of log U. S. plant sales, which in our case is
also output and is reported to be 1.67 in Bernard et al. (2003). Since in our model, this
standard deviation is 1
ε−σ , this implies that the value for ε is 7.27.
The establishments death rate λ is chosen based on empirical evidence reported in
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Table 2: Calibration: targets
Target Value
U.S.average annual inflation rate (1988-2007) 0.0243
Production function returns to scale 0.85
ν
ν+α
0.283
Investment/GDP (net of government expenditure) 0.1851
Standard deviation of log U.S.plant sales 1.67
Manufacturing establishments (1-5 years old) failure rates 0.397
Manufacturing establishments (6-10 years old) failure rates 0.303
Hours-work (rate) 0.255
Dunne et al. (1989). These authors perform an empirical investigation of establishment
turnover using data on plants that first began operating in the 1967, 1972, or 1977 Census
of Manufacturers, a rich source of information concerning the U.S. manufacturing sector.
They report five-year exit rates among plants aged 1-5 year old (39.7 percent), 6-11 year old
(30.3 percent) and older (25.5 percent). As expected, plant failure rates decline with age.
We assume entering establishments do not produce in the first year but simply discover
their productivity level. Thereafter, establishments choosing not to exit the industry only
exit when hit by the exogenous exit-shock. Thus, we decompose the five-year failure rate
of young firms (1-5 years) into two components,
0.397 = F (s∗) + [1− F (s∗)]B4,1−λ (3) , (34)
where B4,1−λ (3) the cumulative probability of 3 successes associated with the binomial
distribution with 4 draws and success probability 1− λ. The first term on the right-hand
side of (34) is the probability of an establishment drawing a low productivity level and
decide to exit. The second term is the probability of an incumbent establishment dieing
over the four following years. This yields an equation in s∗ and λ. The value for λ is set to
match the failure rate of older incumbent firms (6-11 year old), by solving
0.303 = B5,1−λ (4) . (35)
This yields λ = 0.0696. Equipped with λ we use equation (34) to find a relation between
s∗ and s0. However, s0 can be normalized to 1 without loss of generality because it has
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no impact on the endogenous exit-decision of new establishments. This yields a solution
for s∗. Only the ratio η
κ
is identifiable and, hence, we normalize the sunk cost, κ, to 1 and
solve for the resulting fixed operating cost η. From condition (12) and (31) the resulting
value of the fixed operating cost η ranges between 0.0103 and 0.0116, depending on the
model specification.
Finally, A, the parameter measuring the disutility of labor, is chosen so that the house-
hold spends 25.5 percent of its endowment of time working, based on Gomme and Rupert
(2007), who interpret evidence from the American Time-use Survey. Depending on the
model specification, this yields a value for A ranging between 2.3803 and 2.5472.
This completes the calibration description. Table 1 summarizes the parameter values
and Table 2 the targets informing our choices.
5 Results
We use the model economy just described to examine the interaction between money and
the real sector of the economy. We first compare alternative steady states, describing how
the macroeconomic aggregates, including output, consumption, investment and aggregate
hours, and average productivity vary with respect to a benchmark level at various rates of
money growth. We then use data from OECD countries on output and capital per worker
to determine the model ability to explain cross-country evidence. Finally, we use the model
to measure the welfare costs of anticipated inflation under alternative model specifications.
5.1 Steady-state properties
We choose the benchmark monetary growth rate to be 2.43 percent. This value corresponds
to the average inflation rate in the U.S. between 1988 and 2007, a period of relatively
low and stable inflation. Accordingly, Tables 3 and 4 report the log deviation of each
macroeconomic aggregate of interest and of average productivity with respect to the levels
corresponding to the benchmark steady state. We will begin by interpreting the results in
each table.
Table 3 corresponds to model specifications where θh = 1 and hence the marketing good
is a cash good. The Table includes four Panels, each corresponding to an alternative con-
figuration of the cash-in-advance constraint. When the cash-in-advance constraint applies
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Table 3: Steady states associated with various annual monetary growth rates in log-
deviation from benchmark when the marketing good is a cash good, i.e.: θh = 1
Panel A: θc = 1 and θk = 1 Panel B: θc = 1 and θk = 0
100× g β − 1 0.00 2.43* 10 12.43 β − 1 0 2.43* 10 12.43
Output 0.073 0.038 0.000 -0.112 -0.146 0.050 0.023 0.000 -0.070 -0.091
Consumption 0.060 0.031 0.000 -0.093 -0.122 0.050 0.023 0.000 -0.070 -0.091
Investment 0.120 0.062 0.000 -0.183 -0.239 0.050 0.023 0.000 -0.070 -0.091
Hours 0.044 0.023 0.000 -0.067 -0.088 0.039 0.018 0.000 -0.054 -0.070
Productivity 0.006 0.003 0.000 -0.010 -0.013 0.007 0.003 0.000 -0.010 -0.013
Panel C: θc = 0 and θk = 1 Panel D: θc = 0 and θk = 0
100× g β − 1 0.00 2.43* 10 12.43 β − 1 0 2.43* 10 12.43
Output 0.039 0.020 0.000 -0.058 -0.075 0.012 0.005 0.000 -0.016 -0.021
Consumption 0.026 0.013 0.000 -0.040 -0.052 0.012 0.005 0.000 -0.016 -0.021
Investment 0.085 0.044 0.000 -0.129 -0.168 0.012 0.005 0.000 -0.016 -0.021
Hours 0.010 0.005 0.000 -0.014 -0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Productivity 0.006 0.003 0.000 -0.010 -0.013 0.007 0.003 0.000 -0.010 -0.013
Notes: * average U.S. inflation rate over the 1988-2007 period. The steady states are shown in log-deviation from the benchmark model which
corresponds to the economy where the monetary growth rate is given by the U.S. average inflation rate.
to the creation of new establishments, the size distribution of productive establishments
moves toward lower productivity levels at higher monetary growth rates. Hence, the av-
erage productivity of incumbent establishments is lower at high rates of inflation. The
bottom row of each Panel of Table 3 reports the level of average productivity at various
rates of money growth. When all goods are cash goods (Panel A) productivity falls by 1.3
percent when the rate of money growth is 12.43 percent, which is exactly 10 percentage
points above the average U.S. rate of inflation. Instead, by moving from the benchmark
monetary rule to the optimal money growth rule10 (g = β− 1) productivity would increase
in steady state by 0.6 percent. Inspecting each panel reveals that the money growth rule
affects productivity in roughly the same way for each possible configuration of the cash-in-
advance constraint as long as θh = 1. Thus, the monetary growth rate has a robust impact
on average productivity, which results directly from the fact that money holdings are a
requirement for the creation of new establishments.
The results regarding the other macroeconomic aggregates are of course more sensitive
10In the Appendix C, we show that the optimal monetary policy is achieved in the stationary equilibirum
when g = β − 1.
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Table 4: Steady states associated with various annual monetary growth rates in log-
deviation from benchmark when the marketing good is a credit good, i.e.: θh = 0
Panel A: θc = 1 and θk = 1 Panel B: θc = 1 and θk = 0
100× g β − 1 0.00 2.43* 10 12.43 β − 1 0 2.43* 10 12.43
Output 0.062 0.032 0.000 -0.096 -0.125 0.039 0.018 0.000 -0.054 -0.070
Consumption 0.050 0.026 0.000 -0.077 -0.102 0.039 0.018 0.000 -0.054 -0.070
Investment 0.109 0.056 0.000 -0.167 -0.218 0.039 0.018 0.000 -0.054 -0.070
Hours 0.044 0.023 0.000 -0.067 -0.088 0.039 0.018 0.000 -0.054 -0.070
Productivity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Panel C: θc = 0 and θk = 1 Panel D: θc = 0 and θk = 0
100× g β − 1 0.00 2.43* 10 12.43 β − 1 0 2.43* 10 12.43
Output 0.028 0.014 0.000 -0.042 -0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Consumption 0.015 0.008 0.000 -0.024 -0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Investment 0.075 0.038 0.000 -0.113 -0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hours 0.010 0.005 0.000 -0.014 -0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Productivity 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: * average U.S. inflation rate over the 1988-2007 period. The steady states are shown in log-deviation from the benchmark model which
corresponds to the economy where the monetary growth rate is given by the U.S. average inflation rate.
to the model specification. Examining Panel A of Table 3 again reveals that, when all goods
are cash goods, the change in the steady state levels of investment and output associated
with the optimal money growth rule with respect to the benchmark money rule are 12
percent and 7.3 percent, respectively. These adjustments are less substantial when capital
is a credit good but consumption is a cash good as shown in Panel B. Specifically, investment
and output increases by 5 percent if the optimal rule is adopted, instead of the rule which
mimics the average rate of inflation in the United States.
The results in Panel C suggest a prominent role for the cash-in-advance constraint on
the investment good. In particular, the investment associated with optimal policy is 8.5
percent larger. Finally, Panel D is of interest because it illustrates that when the liquidity
constraint only applies to the marketing good changes in the monetary growth rate have
qualitatively the same effects although these are quantitatively small. This suggests that
the cash-in-advance constraint may amplify the burden of inflation when it distorts the
establishments’ entry decision.
Table 4 corresponds to model specifications where θh = 0 and hence the marketing
good is a cash good. Examining each Panel and comparing it to the corresponding Panel
in Table 3 indicates that, although the variations across money growth rates are of the
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same order of magnitude, they are considerably smaller when the sunk cost is not subject
to the liquidity constraint. This confirms the amplification role played by the distortion on
establishments’ entry. In particular, Panel B in Table 4 shows that when only consumption
is a cash good, moving from the benchmark money rule to the optimal money rule increases
consumption by just 3.9 percent. When instead the liquidity constraint applies to the sunk
entry cost (Table 3) the impact is roughly 25 percent greater. Comparing Panels C from
each Table reveals that the increase in consumption associated with the adoption of the
optimal money growth rule when investment is a cash good and consumption is a credit good
is 70 percent higher if the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the sunk entry cost. This
illustrates clearly the gains from improvements in the allocation of the factors of production.
Changes in the size distribution of incumbent establishments may therefore amplify the
welfare cost of inflation because of the lost efficiency in the allocation of productive factors.
Panel D in Table 4 simply illustrates that the cash-in-advance constraints are the single
source of money non-neutrality.
5.2 Model assessment
As just shown, our model predicts that anticipated inflation has a significant influence on
the economy’s steady-state. In particular, steady-state output and the capital stock fall as
the growth rate of the money supply rises above the optimal level (g = β − 1). Moreover,
when the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the sunk entry cost, average productivity
is also predicted to fall as establishment entry decisions are distorted. Here we consider
cross-section data on both output and capital per worker, and inflation rates for a sample
of OECD countries11. The purpose is to illustrate to what extent our model is able to
replicate the empirical relation between inflation and output, and inflation and capital per
worker from a quantitative perspective.
Figure 4 depicts the relations between the logarithm of output per worker and inflation
(upper Panels), and the logarithm of capital per worker and inflation (lower Panels), for
11The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United
Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Portugal, Sweden and the United States. The inflation rate is average inflation between 1970 and 1996
and output per worker and capital per worker are 1996 aggregates.
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Figure 4: Output and capital vs inflation rate across OECD countries and model fit
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Note: The upper panels represent the relation between output per worker and inflation and the lower panels the relation between capital per
worker and inflation in the semi-log scale. The left-hand side panels compares the data to the model specifications where θh = 1 and the right-
hand side panels compare it to model specifications where the θh = 0. Data source: The real aggregates are frin Caselli (2005) and inflation
rates are from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
different specifications of the cash-in-advance constraint. In our sample of OECD countries,
the empirical correlation between inflation and the logarithm of output per worker is 0.76.
The correlation between the logarithm of capital per worker and inflation is equally high.
Of course, this strong correlation is not necessarily due to the causal effect of inflation on
output and capital. Several causalities can justify such a negative relation. For instance,
one may think that countries that are politically unstable are characterized by both low
output per worker and high inflation rates. Another possible causality is encountered
in Koreshkova (2006): low-income countries are characterized by a large informal sector,
which can only be taxed by use of monetary policy (as opposed to fiscal policy), implying
a negative correlation between income and inflation. However, it is worth addressing the
question “how much of the negative relation between inflation and output per worker, and
inflation and capital per worker our model is able to replicate?”.
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Inspection of Figure 4 suggests the model performs well when all cash-in-advance con-
straints apply. To give a more formal examination of this claim, we proceed as follows.
With the use of ordinary least squares, we calculate the slope of a linear regression that
describes the relationship between inflation and the logarithm of output per capita in our
model when all cash-in-advance constraints apply, as well as its empirical counterpart.
Then, we compute the ratio of the slope calculated from the simulated observations to the
slope calculated from the data. This gives a quantitative assessment of the causal effect of
inflation on output and the capital stock.
The regression coefficient on inflation corresponding to the linear projection of the
logarithm of output per worker on inflation and an intercept is −2.10. Similarly, the
regression coefficient on inflation corresponding to the linear projection of the logarithm
of capital per worker on inflation and an intercept is −2.75. In turn, when the cash-in-
advance constraint applies to all the three goods, the best linear fit of the relation between
log output per worker and inflation implied by the model yields a coefficient on inflation
of −1.32. The best linear fit of the relation between the capital-labor ratio and inflation
implied by the model yields a coefficient on inflation of −2.1712. These estimates imply
ratios that are respectively equal to 63 percent and 79 percent. These findings support the
view that the causal mechanism from inflation to output and from inflation to the capital
stock implied by our model explains a large share of the relation observed in the data.
5.3 Welfare costs of inflation
To obtain a measure of the welfare cost associated with inflation we proceed in the same way
as in Cooley and Hansen (1989) with the single difference that we consider as a benchmark
for the monetary growth rate the average rate of inflation for the U.S. instead of considering
the optimal money rule. We do so, because it allows us to characterize a more immediate
way what would be the benefit from adopting optimal policy and it also allows us to consider
the welfare loss if inflation rates increased by 10 percentage points compared to what has
12These values are inside the corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals of the empirical relations.
Specifically, the 95 percent confidence interval of the linear regression of log ’output per worker’ on inflation
is [−2.94 , −1.26] and the 95 percent confidence interval for the linear regression of log ’capital per worker’
on inflation is [−3.85 , −1.64].
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Table 5: Welfare costs associated with various annual growth rates of money
θh = 1 θh = 0
θc = 1 θc = 1 θc = 0 θc = 0 θc = 1 θc = 1 θc = 0 θc = 0
100× g θk = 1 θk = 0 θk = 1 θk = 0 θk = 1 θk = 0 θk = 1 θk = 0
100× (β − 1) 2.18 1.66 1.77 1.19 1.10 0.45 0.70 0.00
0 1.14 0.77 0.91 0.54 0.59 0.23 0.37 0.00
2.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 -3.48 -2.33 -2.73 -1.60 -2.03 -0.85 -1.18 0.00
12.43 -4.56 -3.05 -3.57 -2.08 -2.72 -1.15 -1.57 0.00
15 -5.68 -3.80 -4.44 -2.58 -3.46 -1.49 -1.97 0.00
20 -7.78 -5.22 -6.08 -3.51 -4.91 -2.17 -2.77 0.00
40 -15.14 -10.31 -11.96 -6.81 -10.47 -5.07 -5.86 0.00
Note: * average U.S. inflation rate over the 1988-2007 period. The measure of the welfare cost of inflation is ∆C/C × 100 where ∆C is the
consumption compensation needed for the representative agent to achieve the same steady state utility associated to the U.S. average rate of
inflation.
been the average rate of inflation in the U.S. in the recent history13.
To compute the welfare cost associated with variations in money growth around its
benchmark value, we solve for ∆C in the equation
U¯ = ln (C∗ + ∆C) + A ln (1−N∗) , (36)
where U¯ is the level of utility attained under the benchmark rate of growth of money,
g = 2.43, and C∗ and N∗ are the steady-state consumption and hours associated with the
alternative money growth rule. The measure of the welfare cost of inflation used is the
permanent percentage increase in consumption which makes the representative household
as well of under the alternative regime as it is under the benchmark monetary policy14. The
results of the welfare calculations are expressed as a percent of steady-state consumption
(∆C/C∗), as in Cooley and Hansen (1989).
Table 5 shows our findings. The left-hand side Panel corresponds to the specifications
where the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the entry sunk cost and the right-hand
side Panel consider the other cases. The welfare costs of inflation we obtain are uniformly
larger than the ones obtained by Cooley and Hansen (1989). Although, when the cash-in-
13We consider the average rate of inflation for the United States to be 2.43 percent. This corresponds
to the average growth rate of prices as taken from the World Economic Indicators database in the sample
period 1988-2007.
14The percentage increase as a fraction of income can be obtained simply by multiplying ∆C/C by the
consumption/output ratio (≈ 0.815).
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advance constraint does not apply to the sunk cost, they are roughly of the same order of
magnitude.
We consider first the specification where consumption is the single cash good because
this corresponds more closely to the Cooley and Hansen model. In this specification, the
welfare cost of a 12.43 percent rate of inflation, relative to the benchmark of g = 2.43,
is 1.15 percent of steady state consumption. The welfare gain associated with moving
from the benchmark money growth rule to the optimal rule is 0.45 percent of steady state
consumption. These numbers are roughly three times as large as the ones reported in
Cooley and Hansen, even if average productivity is not distorted by monetary policy. When
both consumption and investment are cash goods but the marketing good is a credit good,
the welfare cost estimates roughly double. For example, the welfare gain associated with
adopting the optimal policy becomes 1.10 percent of steady-state consumption. If only
investment is a cash good the welfare gain is about 0.7 percent.
However, when the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the marketing good, the wel-
fare costs of inflation increase substantially. For example, the welfare gain associated with
adopting the optimal policy corresponds to 2.18 percent of steady-state consumption when
all goods are cash goods (first cell of the left-hand side Panel). This number is about an
order of magnitude greater than the findings in Cooley and Hansen. Moreover, is twice as
large as the corresponding figure when only consumption and investment are cash goods,
(1.10 percent). Thus, it seems that roughly 1/2 of the welfare cost of inflation is driven by
the distortions to the firm entry decision. Therefore, a substantial part of the welfare losses
at high rates of inflation are explained by less efficiency in the allocation of resources across
incumbent establishments and not just by less accumulation of factors of production.
The wage rate is often a convenient measure of welfare. Figure 5 shows the relation in
the data between labor compensation per employee in 1996 and the average rate of inflation
from 1970 to 1996 for 21 OECD countries (the solid line depicts the best linear fit). Clearly
there is a strong negative correlation between inflation rates and the labor compensation
per employee. The correlation between these two variables is -0.79. Our model also predicts
such a negative relation. For instance, when the cash-in-advance applies to the marketing
good, inflation increases the effective cost of entry, which has an effect on the ability of
establishments to pay wages since the expected value of entry has to increase in equilibrium.
The decrease in wages in turn allows low-productivity establishments to survive, yielding a
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Figure 5: Labor compensation per employee and inflation rates
Data: $US (PPP adjusted) Labor compensation per employee in 1996 – OECD source – and average inflation rate between 1970 and 1996 in
OECD countries. The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden and the United States.
drop in average productivity. Figure 6 illustrates how small movements in productivity are
associated with strong movements in the wage rate. Thus, even if high rates of inflation are
associated with modest falls in average productivity, the welfare loss is important because
the fall in the wage rate is strong. The movements in the wage rate are largely driven by
the establishments’ entry dynamics. Thus, having an endogenous distribution of productive
establishments is important to characterize fully the welfare cost of inflation.
5.4 Sensitivity to alternative parameterizations
Atkeson et al. (1996) forcefully show that the choice of the returns to scale in models with
industry dynamics is an important determinant of the size of the effect of policy distortions
on average productivity and welfare15. Therefore, in this section we consider how sensitive
our estimates of the welfare costs of inflation are to changes in the returns to scale. As
expected, as α + ν approaches one, productivity is no longer affected by changes in the
monetary growth rate and the contribution of factors reallocation to the welfare cost of
inflation disappears. However, this contribution increases at a high rate, as the intensity of
15Moreover, it should be noted that Atkeson et al. (1996) present evidence against the hypothesis that
plant production or profit functions are nearly linear. This offers support to the view that policy distortions
have sizable effects.
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Figure 6: Wage rate and average productivity associated with various annual growth rates
of money
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Table 6: Welfare costs corresponding to different degrees of diminishing returns to scale
θh = 0 θh = 1 Share of welfare cost
α + ν 100× ∆s¯
s¯
100× ∆C
C
100× ∆C
C
explained by fall in s¯
0.75 -2.03 -2.17 -5.44 0.60
0.80 -1.66 -2.52 -5.04 0.50
0.85 -1.28 -2.72 -4.56 0.40
0.90 -0.89 -2.83 -4.03 0.30
0.95 -0.45 -2.87 -3.45 0.17
0.99 -0.09 -2.86 -2.98 0.04
Note: The measure of the welfare cost of inflation is ∆C/C × 100 where ∆C is the consumption compensation needed for the representative
agent to achieve the same steady state utility associated to the U.S. average rate of inflation (2.43 percent), at a rate of inflation which is ten
percentage points higher (12.43 percent). The average productivity s¯ is written in log-deviation from the benchmark economy. For each model
specification both consumption and investment are cash goods.
diminishing returns increases. Moreover, we also consider the sensitivity of our findings to
changes in ε, the shape parameter of the distribution of productivity draws which controls
the dispersion of incumbents’ productivities.
Table 6 shows the average productivity associated to different degrees of diminishing
returns to scale and the corresponding welfare cost of inflation for two different models
specifications (when the marketing good is a credit good and when it is a cash good). For
each model specification both consumption and investment are cash goods. This allows us
to understand the role of productivity in explaining the welfare cost of inflation for differ-
ent degrees of diminishing returns. The measure of welfare considered is the consumption
compensation – as a fraction of steady state consumption under the benchmark monetary
policy – needed for the representative agent to achieve the same steady state utility associ-
ated to the U.S. average rate of inflation (2.43 percent), at a rate of inflation which is ten
percentage points higher (12.43 percent).
Naturally, when the returns to scale are nearly constant, α+ ν = 0.99, the productivity
is almost not affected at a higher rate of inflation. Indeed, average productivity is only
0.09 percent lower at 12.43 percent inflation, compared to what it would be at 2.43 percent
inflation. Accordingly, the welfare costs of inflation are roughly the same, irrespectively
of whether the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the marketing good or not. The last
column of Table 6 shows how distortions to the size distribution of productive establish-
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ments contribute to the welfare costs of inflation16. As expected, when the returns to scale
are near constant this contribution is very small. However, this contribution increases fast,
as the intensity of diminishing returns increases. Indeed, for the range of α + ν between
0.75 and 0.90, which is likely to include the empirically relevant values, the contribution of
distortions to the size distribution of incumbents is sizable, taking values between 30 and
60 percent of the total welfare cost of inflation.
As the intensity of diminishing returns increases, the share of welfare cost explained by
a fall in average productivity increases (see the last column in Table 6). This happens for
two reasons. First, as returns diminish faster, the distortions to the size distribution of
establishments, resulting from the inflation tax, are more important and lead to significant
falls in average productivity (see column 4). Thus, when the cash-in-advance constraint
applies to the marketing good, i.e. θh = 1, the welfare cost of inflation is high. However,
an additional reason why the contribution of falls in average productivity to the welfare
cost of inflation increases at lower values of α + ν is that when the marketing good is a
credit good, i.e. θh = 0, the welfare cost of inflation increases as the intensity of diminishing
returns to scale decreases (see column 3). This is because, when θh = 0 the welfare cost is
explained by the fall in the accumulation of factors. Thus, when α + ν is low, the falls in
output and welfare associated to the inflation tax are less important. Overall, for values of
α+ ν which are empirically relevant, the contribution of distortions to the size distribution
of productive establishments is substantial and the welfare costs of a 10 percentage points
increase in the rate of inflation, when the cash-in-advance constraint applies to the creation
of new establishments, vary between 4 and 5.5 percent of aggregate consumption.
The calibration of ε, the shape parameter of the productivity distribution F (s), was
based on empirical evidence, reported in Bernard et al., concerning the variability of sales
across productive establishments. However, ε is admittedly a difficult parameter to choose.
Thus, it is useful to examine how sensible are our findings to change in the target for the
variability of firms output. Table 7 shows different welfare cost estimates as we vary the
amount of establishment heterogeneity. As the dispersion of establishments’ productivities
increases, the fall in productivity associated to an increase in the rate of inflation, from
16We quantify this by computing the percentage increase in the welfare cost of inflation when the cash-
in-advance constraint applies to the sunk entry cost.
31
Table 7: Welfare costs corresponding to different degrees of establishment heterogeneity
Volatility of θh = 0 θh = 1 Share of welfare cost
output ≡ 1
−σ 100× ∆s¯s¯ 100× ∆CC 100× ∆CC explained by fall in s¯
0.50 -1.07 -2.64 -4.19 0.36
1.00 -1.22 -2.70 -4.44 0.39
1.67 -1.28 -2.72 -4.56 0.40
2.00 -1.30 -2.73 -4.58 0.40
3.34 -1.34 -2.74 -4.66 0.41
5.00 -1.36 -2.75 -4.69 0.41
Note: The measure of the welfare cost of inflation is ∆C/C × 100 where ∆C is the consumption compensation needed for the representative
agent to achieve the same steady state utility associated to the U.S. average rate of inflation (2.43 percent), at a rate of inflation which is ten
percentage points higher (12.43 percent). The average productivity s¯ is written in log-deviation from the benchmark economy. For each model
specification both consumption and investment are cash goods.
2.43 percent to 12.43 percent, increases only marginally. Since the magnitudes of the
productivity losses are essentially unaffected by changes in the productivity dispersion, it
is not surprising to find that the magnitudes of the welfare estimates also do not change
across alternative parameterizations. Therefore, we conclude that our findings are robust
to changes in the variability of establishment productivity draws.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we set out to investigate whether it is important to model heterogeneity across
productive establishments when quantifying the welfare cost of inflation. For this purpose,
we studied a model characterized with cash-in-advance constraints on consumption and in-
vestment goods, and in addition we assume that cash-in-advance constraints also apply to
the creation of new establishments. Besides discouraging investment and labor supply, an
increase in the long-run rate of money growth increases the cost of creating new establish-
ments and distorts firm entry and exit dynamics. As a result, incumbent establishments’
profits must increase so as to encourage industry entry. This occurs through a fall in the
equilibrium wage rate. As the equilibrium wage rate falls, less productive establishment
choose to become incumbents, lowering average productivity. The adjustment in the pro-
ductivity distribution of incumbent establishments is responsible for a substantial part of
the welfare cost of inflation.
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An important task is to investigate further the robustness of our findings. For instance,
often some criticism focuses on the fact that the determination of goods as cash-purchased
or credit purchased is exogenous; the consumer lacks the flexibility to optimally choose the
fraction of purchases of any particular good which are payed with cash. Gillman (1993)
addresses this issue within a cash-in-advance economy, by specifying an exchange function
through which the consumer decides whether to use cash or costly credit to purchase a
specific good. He finds that having the ability to switch to costly credit, increases the welfare
costs in comparison to standard cash-in-advance economies. This is because avoiding the
inflation tax means switching from fiat that uses no resources to exchange credit that
uses up societal resources. Inflation acts through cash as a public tax with real proceeds
returned in a lump sum fashion, while it acts through credit as a private societal tax with
real proceeds destroyed. It would be interesting to study whether this result extends to our
framework, with endogenous productivity. We leave this for future work.
As was mentioned earlier, Baily et al. (1992) document that about half of overall pro-
ductivity growth in U.S. manufacturing in the 1980’s can be attributed to factor reallocation
from low productivity to high productivity establishments. It is tempting to imagine that
the monetary policy tightening and resulting sustained disinflation which occurred over
the same period may have contributed to the reallocation of factors and improvements in
efficiency.
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Appendix
A Locally vertical WW locus
The purpose of this section is to show that the WW locus is locally vertical. Hence,
equilibrium wage rate w and s∗ are independent. To do this, we apply the implicit func-
tion theorem to the relation (31) with the purpose of finding dw
ds∗ . First, notice that the
relation (31) can be re-written as
κ
[
1 + θh
(
1 + g
β
− 1
)]
1− β (1− λ)
β
+ [1− F (s∗)] η − Ω
∫∞
s∗ s
σdF (s)
wασrνσ
= 0, (37)
which can simply be written as Φ (s∗, w) = 0. Moreover, by the implicit function theorem
dw
ds∗ = −∂Φ(s
∗,w)
∂s∗ /
∂Φ(s∗,w)
∂w
.
Since
∂Φ (s∗, w)
∂w
=
ασΩ
w1+ασrνσ
∫ ∞
s∗
sσdF (s) > 0,
a sufficient and necessary condition for dw
ds∗ = 0 is simply
∂Φ(s∗,w)
∂s∗ = 0. In turn
∂Φ (s∗, w)
∂s∗
= f (s∗)
(
Ωs∗σ
wασrνσ
− η
)
= 0,
because relation (32) implies that in equilibrium Ωs
∗σ
wασrνσ
= η. Therefore dw
ds∗ = 0 and the
WW locus is locally vertical.
B Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
This Section contains a proof that the relations (31) and (32) always define a unique
equilibrium17. The condition (31) implies a relation for average profits, given by
z¯ = κ
[
1 + θh
(
1 + g
β
− 1
)] 1
β
− 1 + λ
1− F (s∗) . (38)
In turn, combining the relations (12) and (32) implies that average profits must satisfy the
equilibrium condition given by
z¯ = η
[( s¯
s∗
)σ
− 1
]
. (39)
17A similar argument for proving existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in this class of heterogeneous
firm models can be found in Melitz (2003).
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Consequently, a sufficient condition for ensuring the existence and uniqueness of s∗ is
that
j (sˆ) = [1− F (sˆ)]
[(
s¯ (sˆ)
sˆ
)σ
− 1
]
be monotonically decreasing from infinity to zero on (0,∞), where
s¯ (sˆ)σ =
1
1− F (sˆ)
∫ ∞
sˆ
sσdF (s) .
Define
ι (sˆ) =
(
s¯ (sˆ)
sˆ
)σ
− 1.
By applying the Chain and Leibniz rules, the derivative of ι (sˆ) with respect to sˆ is found
to be
ι′ (sˆ) =
f (sˆ)
1− F (sˆ)
[(
s¯ (sˆ)
sˆ
)σ
− 1
]
− σ
sˆ
(
s¯ (sˆ)
sˆ
)σ
. (40)
=
ι (sˆ) f (sˆ)
1− F (sˆ) −
σι (sˆ) + σ
sˆ
(41)
Thus, the derivative and elasticity of j (sˆ) are given by
j′ (sˆ) = −σ
sˆ
(ι (sˆ) + 1) [1− F (sˆ)] < 0, (42)
j′ (sˆ) sˆ
j (sˆ)
= −σ
(
1 +
1
ι (sˆ)
)
< −σ. (43)
Since j (sˆ) is non-negative and its elasticity with respect to sˆ is strictly negative, j
(
Sˆ
)
must
be decreasing to zero as sˆ goes to infinity. Moreover, limsˆ→0 j (sˆ) =∞ since limsˆ→0 ι (sˆ) =
∞. Hence, j (sˆ) is monotonically decreasing from infinity to zero on (0,∞) as needed to
be proved.
C Optimal monetary policy
Here we derive the optimal rate of inflation. The proof relies on the observation that the
optimal inflation rate corresponds to the case where the cash-in-advance constraint is not
binding. When the cash-in-advance constraint is not binding the corresponding Lagrange
multiplier is zero, i.e. φt = 0 for all t. To derive the optimal rate of inflation we start by
noticing that Equation (22) can be rewritten as
φt+1 =
γt
β
pt+1
pt
− γt+1. (44)
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Hence, φt+1 = 0 if and only if
γt+1
γt
=
pt+1/pt
β
(45)
Given that γt is constant in the stationary equilibrium and positive (from equation (15)),
and the growth rate of money is equal to inflation in that equilibrium, it follows that the
Friedman rule applies to the stationary equilibrium of our model, that is, the optimal rate
of inflation is equal to (β − 1).
D Proof of Proposition 1
Following is a proof of Proposition 1. The case where all θi’s are zero is trivial. In the next
subsections, we analyze in more details the effect of anticipated inflation when one of the
θi’s takes value one.
D.1 Case where θc = 1, θk = 0 and θh = 0
We consider first the case where θc = 1, θk = 0 and θh = 0. Notice that in this context
inflation does not affect the rental cost of capital in (30), nor the productivity threshold
and the wage rate in (31) and (32). From (4), (6), (7) and (8), this implies that average
output, employment, capital use and profits are also not affected by inflation.
To determine the effect of inflation on the other aggregates, notice that in the stationary
equilibrium X = δK = δk¯H, κE = κ λ
1−F (s∗)H and Y = y¯H. Replace those equations and
(29) in (28) to get:
Lw
A
[
1 + θc
(
1+g
β
− 1
)] + δk¯H + κ λ
1− F (s∗)H = y¯H (46)
Given the labor-market clearing condition, we can write L = 1−N = 1− n¯H. Replacing
this relation in the above equation and rearranging terms leads:
H =
w
A
[
1 + θc
(
1+g
β
− 1
)]
y¯ − δk¯ − κ λ
1− F (s∗) +
wn¯
A
[
1 + θc
(
1+g
β
− 1
)]
−1 (47)
Equation(47) shows that when θc = 1, an increase in the anticipated rate of inflation g
decreases the mass of incumbent firms H. Given that average employment, capital and
output are not affected, this implies that an increase in the anticipated rate of inflation g
also decreases the aggregate level of capital, employment and output.
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D.2 Case where θc = 0, θk = 1 and θh = 0
When θk = 1, equation (30) shows that an increase in g increases the rental cost of capital
r.
To determine the effect of inflation on the productivity threshold and the wage rate in
this context we use condition (39). Replacing this relation in the free-entry condition (31),
we then have
κ
[
1 + θh
(
1 + g
β
− 1
)]
= [1− F (s∗)] β
1− β(1− λ)η
[( s¯
s∗
)σ
− 1
]
. (48)
Hence, the productivity threshold does not depend on the rental cost of capital. Following
an increase in g, the negative effect of the increase in r on profits cancels out with the
positive effect of a decrease in wages. This latter can be seen from equations (30), (32)
and (48).
Regarding the effect of inflation on average output per establishment, remark that, from
equations (4), (6) and (7), average output can be written as
y¯ = s¯σ
(α
w
)ασ (ν
r
)νσ
. (49)
By replacing (32) in the above equation, one gets
y¯ =
η
Ω
( s¯
s∗
)σ
αασννσ. (50)
Hence inflation does not affect average output.
To determine the impact on average capital and employment, notice from (6) and (7)
and the fact that the productivity threshold is not affected by inflation that
d ln n¯ = −(1− ν)σd lnw − νσd ln r (51)
d ln k¯ = −ασd lnw − (1− α)σd ln r (52)
Given that
αd lnw = −νd ln r (53)
from equation (32) and the fact that s∗ is not affected by inflation, this set of equations
can be rewritten as
d ln n¯ =
ν
α
d ln r (54)
d ln k¯ = −d ln r (55)
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Thus an increase in inflation increases the average level of employment per establishment,
while it decreases average capital use.
Equation (47) is still valid if the cash-in-advance constraint only applies to investment.
Consequently, if inflation increases average employment, decreases the wage rate and av-
erage capital and does not affect average output and the productivity threshold, then it
decreases the mass of incumbent establishments from equation (47). Hence, aggregate out-
put and stock of capital decrease too. But, the effect on aggregate employment is a priori
ambiguous given that H decreases and n¯ increases. To show that the effect on aggregate
employment is actually negative, first notice that
d lnN = d ln n¯+ d lnH. (56)
Next, from equation (47), observe that
d lnH = d lnw −Nd lnw −Nd ln n¯+
δKA
(
1 + θc
(
1+g
β
− 1
))
w
d ln k¯. (57)
Replacing the above equation and (53) and (54) in (57)
d lnN =
δKA
(
1 + θc
(
1+g
β
− 1
))
w
d ln k¯. (58)
Thus, aggregate employment decreases following an increase in inflation.
D.3 Case where θc = 0, θk = 0 and θh = 1
Here the rental cost of capital is not affected by inflation (see equation (30)).
To understand the effect on the productivity threshold and the wage rate, combine (8)
and (32) with (31) to get
κ
[
1 + θh
(
1 + g
β
− 1
)]
= [1− F (s∗)] β
1− β(1− λ)η
[( s¯
s∗
)σ
− 1
]
. (59)
Hence an increase in inflation decreases the productivity threshold s∗.
From equation (32) it follows that the wage rate decreases too.
From (50), average output increases given s∗ decreases as
d ln y¯ = σ [d ln s¯− d ln s∗] . (60)
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To determine the effect on average employment and capital, notice from (32) that
d ln s∗ = αd lnw. (61)
By replacing the above equation in (6) and (7), we have
d ln n¯ = σ
[
d ln s¯− 1− ν
α
d ln s∗
]
(62)
d ln k¯ = σ [d ln s¯− d ln s∗] (63)
Hence, average capital increases following an increase in the rate of money growth and the
impact of inflation on average employment is ambiguous.
We now investigate the effect of g on H. Observe that we have from (47) that
d lnH = d lnw− AY
w
d ln y¯ +
AX
w
d ln k¯ −Nd lnw−Nd ln n¯+ AEκ
w
f(s∗)s∗
1− F (s∗)d ln s
∗. (64)
The above equation can be rewritten as
d lnH =
{
AXσ
w
− AY σ
w
−Nσ
}
d ln s¯
+
{
1−N
α
+
Nσ(1− ν)
α
+
AY σ
w
− AXσ
w
+
AEκ
w
f(s∗)s∗
1− F (s∗)
}
d ln s∗.
Given d ln s¯ ≤ d ln s∗, Y ≥ X and 1−N
α
+ Nσ(1−ν)
α
> Nσ, it follows the mass of incumbents
H decreases as a result of an increase in g.
The impact on aggregate employment is given by
d lnN =
{
AXσ
w
− AY σ
w
+ (1−N)σ
}
d ln s¯
+
{
AY σ
w
− AXσ
w
+
AEκ
w
f(s∗)s∗
1− F (s∗) − (1−N)σ
}
d ln s∗.
By use of (28) and (29), this equation simplifies as
d lnN =
{
ACσ
w
θc
(
1 + g
β
− 1
)
− AEκσ
w
}
d ln s¯
+
{
AEκ
w
f(s∗)s∗
1− F (s∗) −
ACσ
w
θc
(
1 + g
β
− 1
)
+
AEκσ
w
}
d ln s∗.
Hence, aggregate employment decreases following an increase in g if θc = 0.
Notice that, from (60) and (63), the effect on average capital and average output are
the same. Hence, to determine the effect on aggregate output and capital, it is sufficient
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to know only one of the two effects given that they are the same. We choose to determine
the effect on aggregate output:
d lnY = d ln y¯ + d lnH (65)
This equation can be rewritten as
d lnY =
{
AXσ
w
− AY σ
w
+ (1−N)σ
}
d ln s¯
+
{
AY σ
w
− AXσ
w
+
AEκ
w
f(s∗)s∗
1− F (s∗) − (1−N)σ +
1
α
}
d ln s∗.
Given the discussion regarding the effect of g on N , by the same arguments, it follows that
the effect of g on Y and K is negative as well.
E Solutions
r =
(
1
β
− 1 + δ
)[
1 + θk
(
1 + g
β
− 1
)]
w =
 βσ/(ε− σ)
κ
[
1 + θh
(
1+g
β
− 1
)]
[1− β(1− λ)]
 1αε (s0Ω 1σ η σ−εσε
rν
) 1
α
s∗ =
 β
1− β(1− λ)
σ
ε− σ
η
κ
1
1 + θh
(
1+g
β
− 1
)
 1ε s0
s¯ =
(
ε
ε− σ
)1/σ
s∗
k¯ =
ε
ε− σ
(α
w
)ασ (ν
r
)(1−α)σ
s∗σ
n¯ =
ε
ε− σ
(α
w
)(1−ν)σ (ν
r
)νσ
s∗σ
y¯ =
ε
ε− σ
(α
w
)ασ (ν
r
)νσ
s∗σ − η
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z¯ = Ω
ε
ε− σ
s∗σ
wασrνσ
− η
H =
w
A
[
1 + θc(
1+g
β
− 1)
]
y¯ − δk¯ − κλ(s∗
s0
)ε
+
wn¯
A
[
1 + θc(
1+g
β
− 1)
]
−1
E =
λ
(s0/s∗)ε
H
K = Hk¯
X = δK
N = Hn¯
C =
(1−N)w
A
[
1 + θc(
1+g
β
− 1)
]
Y = Hy¯
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